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CALIBRATED COMMITMENT: THE LEGAL
TREATMENT OF MARRIAGE
AND COHABITATION
Milton C. Regan, Jr.*
INTRODUCTION
The rate of cohabitation without marriage has increased dramati-
cally in Westem countries over the past few decades.' Moreover, re-
search suggests that cohabitation has become less of an "engagement"
that serves as a prelude to marriage and more of an intimate arrange-
ment that may serve as an alternative to it.2 In other words, it is less
accurate than before to describe those who cohabit as simply involved
in a "trial" marriage.3 Many cohabitors instead regard living together
as a way to have an intinate relationship that may or may not result in
a decision to marry. This is reflected, for instance, in tie declining
* Professor of Law, Georgetown University Law Center. My thanks to Professor
Donna Ruane Morrison of the Georgetown University Public Policy Institute, who
guided me through the social science literature on cohabitation and who offered
valuable comments on a draft of this Essay.
1 See PRInciPLEs OF THE LAW OF FAMILY DISSOLUTION: ANALSIS ,%ND REcOIMEFN-DA-
TIONS § 6.03 Reporter's Notes, cmt. a (Tentative Draft No. 4, 2000) [hereinafter ALl
PRINcPLFs (Tentative Draft 2000)]; Larry Bumpass & Hsien-Hen Lu, Trends in Cohabi-
tation and Implications for Children's Family Contet in the United States, 54 POPULATION
STUD. 29, 29-30 (2000); Kathleen Kiernan, Cohabitation in Western Europe: Trends,
Issues and Implications 1 (Oct. 30, 2000) (unpublished manuscript presented at the
symposium, Just Living Together Implications of Cohabitation for Children, Families, and
Policy, at Pennsylvania State University (Oct. 30-31, 2000)) (on file with author).
2 See, e.g., Ronald R. Rindfuss & Audrey VandenHeuvel, Cohabitation: A PrNeuarsor
to Marriage or an Alternative to Being Single?, 16 POPULTON & DE%. REv. 703 passim
(1990); Pamela J. Smock & Sanjiv Gupta, Cohabitation in Contemporary North
America 25 (Oct. 30, 2000) (unpublished manuscript presented at the symposium,
Just Living Together Implications of Cohabitation for Children, Families, md Policy, at Penn-
sylvania State University (Oct. 30-31, 2000)) (on file with author).
3 See Larry L Bumpass, The Changing Significance of Maniage in the United States in
TmE CHANGING FANILY IN COMPARATIVE PERSPECTIVE: As AND THE UNrrF= STATES 63,
71 (Karen Oppenheim Mason et al. eds., 1998) ("There is clear evidence now ... that
the probability of marrying following cohabitation is declining, as is the probability of
marrying a cohabiting partner.").
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percentage of cohabitors who eventually marry4 and in the fact that a
portion of the declining rate of marriage is due to the increasing rate
of cohabitation.5 In addition, the percentage of cohabitors who have
been together for three years or more has increased,6 as well as the
percentage of cohabiting households in which children reside.7
These trends raise the question whether American law should
more explicitly "institutionalize" cohabitation by ending the different
treatment of marital and non-marital relationships, thereby making
available to cohabitors a host of benefits currently available only to
those who are married.8 There are signs that, to varying degrees, the
institutionalization of cohabitation already has begun. The most com-
prehensive example is the Scandanavian countries, where cohabita-
tion arguably has come -losest to representing a widely-accepted
alternative to marriage. The law in these countries treats cohabitation
as virtually indistinguishable from marriage.9 Similarly, in Canada,
the Modernization of Benefits and Obligations Act has eliminated fed-
eral legal distinctions between married couples and those who cohabit
for at least a year. 10 As a result, "[t]he upshot is that all conjugal un-
ions are now almost fully equivalent under Canadian federal law, the
remaining distinction being that married people do not have to live
together for a year for the benefits and obligations to apply to
them.""
In the United States, Vermont has enacted legislation that treats
all same-sex couples who enter into a civil union the same as those
who are married, except for the former's inability to be formally mar-
ried.' 2 Less comprehensively, several municipalities and some states
have passed domestic partner provisions that extend selected benefits
to unmarried partners, or at least offer cohabitors the opportunity to
register as partners for the purpose of obtaining certain privileges
4 Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 15.
5 Larry L. Bumpass et al., The Role of Cohabitation in Declining Rates of Marriage, 53
J. MARRIAGE & FAM. 913, 913 (1991).
6 Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 16; see also Michael Murphy, The Evolution of
Cohabitation in Britain, 1960-95, 54 POPULATION STUD. 43, 49-50 (2000).
7 Bumpass & Lu, supra note 1, at 29-30; Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 16.
8 On the concept of institutionalization, see IANDAJ. WAITE, Cohabitation: A Com-
munitarian Perspective, in MARRIAGE IN AmvUcA: A COMMUNITARIAN PERsiECriVE 15-17
(Martin King Whyte ed., 2000); Steven L. Nock, A Comparison of Marriages and Cohab
iting Relationships, 16J. FM. IssuEs 53, 55-74 (1995); Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at
21.
9 See E.J. GRAFF, WHAT Is MARRIAGE FOR? 52 (1999).
10 See Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 22.
11 IdL
12 See VT. STAT. ANN. tit. 15, § 1204(a) (Supp. 2000).
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from public or private entities.13 Finally, the growth in the number of
courts that are willing to find a basis for honoring financial claims by
partners against one another at the dissolution of the relationship re-
flects increasing willingness to provide economic remedies similar to
those available to spouses who divorce.14
On one view, full institutionalization is warranted because cohabi-
tation and marriage involve substantially the same attitudes and orien-
tation. The claim is that they differ only in the willingness of the
couple to go through the formality of marriage, which is an insuffi-
cient basis for distinguishing between them.15 From this perspective,
cohabitation has become a more important relationship for persons
who desire intimate commitment but reject the need for formal legal
recognition of this commitment. For these couples, "real" marriage is
a frame of mind, not the possession of a marriage certificate. Such a
view arguably harkens back to an earlier historical time, before church
and state found it in their interest to insist upon ceremonial formali-
ties as the prerequisite for marriage. In that era, couples who lived
together "as man and wife" were regarded as married because of their
conduct, not because they had participated in a prescribed ritualY3
Some might maintain that modem cohabitors can be seen as in-
heritors of this tradition. The argument is that those who live to-
gether without marriage are just as committed as those who are
married, but they reject the baggage that goes along with that legal
status. Some research indicates, for instance, that those who cohabit
have more egalitarian views on gender roles than do spouses.' 7 For
such couples, eschewing marriage may be a way to reject the gender
assumptions that have been so prominent a feature of marriage as a
social institution.
An alternative argument for institutionalization is that respect for
individual privacy and autonomy mandates that the state not favor any
particular form of intimate relationship above others. If marriage is
losing favor because it meets the needs of fewer people, then the state
13 For an overview of such provisions, seeJulianna S. Gonen, Same-Sex Unions and
Domestic Partnerships, 2 GEo.J. GENDER & L. 329 (2001).
14 See ALI Pn Ncu'L.s (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 1, § 6.03 Reporter's
Notes, cmt b.
15 See GRAnF, supra note 9, at 209-15.
16 See id. at 193-95.
17 See Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 6 ("[C]ohabitation tends to be selective of
people who are slightly more liberal, less religious, and more supportive of egalitarian
gender roles and nontraditional family roles."); see also Main Clarkberg et M., Atti-
tudes, Values, and Entrance into Cohabitation venus Marital Unions, 74 Soc. FoncRs 609,
622-24 (1995).
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should not try artificially to prop it up by creating incentives for part-
ners to enter into an arrangement that they otherwise would not
choose. On this view, the rise in cohabitation reflects the fact that
many partners now desire more individual independence, and less
commitment, as a part of their intimate relationships.' 8 Rather than
take the whole package of benefits and burdens that marriage pro-
vides, couples prefer to tailor the terms of their relationships so they
reflect their own unique preferences. Cohabitation, thus, can accom-
modate the wide range of wishes about how people want to arrange
their personal lives better than marriage. Its growth reflects the
greater prominence of the ideals of individual autonomy and privacy
in intimate matters.
Are these arguments persuasive? Should legal trends continue so
that cohabitation and marriage ultimately receive virtually identical
legal recognition? On balance, I think that the answer is no. First, I
am skeptical that cohabitors are married in substance but simply not
in form. Research indicates that cohabiting relationships are less sta-
ble than marriages and that they generally reflect less commitment by
partners to one another.19 Second, law need not be agnostic among
types of intimate relationships. There are good reasons for law to pro-
mote marriage, because there are good reasons to promote intimate
commitment. Blurring the line between married and unmarried
couples would undermine the ability to express this preference.
At the same time, it seems inadvisable to proclaim a preference
for marriage by denying cohabitors all the legal privileges available to
spouses. Neither categorical extension nor denial of all marriage-like
benefits to cohabiting partners is appropriate. With respect to certain
issues, the state's desire to create incentives or express social values
may be outweighed by more important considerations. This means
that making decisions about the respects in which cohabitors should
enjoy legal treatment similar to spouses requires sensitivity to the in-
terests at stake in each instance. In this Essay, I examine a variety of
benefits and suggest some general rules of thumb about when the le-
gal claims of cohabitors should be honored as if made by spouses.
A couple of points are worth making at the outset of my argu-
ment. First, I speak in this Essay primarily about the extension of ben-
efits to domestic partners, rather than the imposition of duties upon
them. That is because this has been the focus of most of the debate
about the legal treatment of married and unmarried couples. I read-
18 FRANcEs K. GOLDSCHNEIDER & LINDAJ. WArT, NEv FAMILIES, No FAM1L:S? TnE
TRANSFORMATION OF THE AMERICAN HOME 62-63 (1991).
19 See text accompanying infta notes 22-26.
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ily acknowledge, however, that a fuller debate would consider not only
when domestic partners should be given rights, but also when they
should assume certain responsibilities. Indeed, as I will make clear,
one reason for rejecting certain claims by unmarried couples is that
they seek benefits comparable to those available to spouses without
corresponding obligations to which married partners are subject.20
Second, my focus is on the legal treatment of those who are mar-
ried and those who have the option to marry but do not do so. As I
have argued elsewhere, I believe that marriage should be open to
partners in same-sex relationships.21 In the absence of this right to
marry, domestic partner legislation is a humane and pragmatic way to
recognize the commitment of many of these couples. For this reason,
asking how married and unmarried opposite-sex couples should be
treated in comparison to one another raises issues different from
those that deal with the relative treatment of opposite-sex and same-
sex couples. I concern myself in this Essay with the first question, but
also suggest how permitting same-sex couples to marry may in fact
strengthen, rather than weaken, the privileged position of marriage.
I. MARRwAGE, COHABrrATION, AND UNEQUAL TREA~TF-\r
In this Part, I argue that married and unmarried partners should
not be accorded similar legal treatment because (1) marriage tends to
be a more enduring relationship than cohabitation, and (2) society is
justified in privileging marriage as a way of expressing the importance
of intimate commitment. Furthermore, I suggest, those who invoke
the value of private ordering to criticize preferential treatment for
marriage overlook the fact that in certain respects those who marry
have more latitude to arrange their relationships as they wish than
those who cohabit.
A. Relative Stability and Commitment
The first reason for resisting full legal institutionalization of co-
habitation is that evidence suggests that cohabitation is less stable
than marriage. Cohabitors break up at a higher rate than spouses di-
vorce and live together for a briefer duration than married couples.2
Furthermore, even those cohabitors who eventually marry divorce at a
20 See text accompanying infra notes 100-10.
21 See MILTON C. REGN, JR., FAMILY LAw,-%, AND THE PURSUIT OF IN-LaLCY 119-22
(1993).
22 See Bumpass & Lu, supra note 1, at 33; Jay D. Teachman et al., Legal Status and
the Stability of Coresidential Unions, 28 DEMOGwRHy 571, 583 (1991); WmrE, supra note
8.
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higher rate than spouses who never lived together before marriage.
2
'
Some uncertainty exists about the extent to which these differences
reflect the fact that those who are less committed are attracted to co-
habitation, as opposed to cohabitation itself shaping attitudes about
the desirability and feasibility of permanence and commitment in inti-
mate relationships. 24 In any event, it seems inaccurate to contend that
cohabitors differ from spouses only in their unwillingness to clothe
their relationship with the formal status of marriage. Rather, unmar-
ried partners generally are less committed to one another than are
spouses.2 5 Furthermore, this commitment generally results in greater
well-being for spouses than for domestic partners.2 6
Advocates of the view that cohabitation and marriage are substan-
tively the same might claim that unmarried cohabitation simply repre-
sents the return of an historical social arrangement whereby a
couple's conduct, rather than its participation in a ceremony, was re-
garded as constituting marriage.2 7 The rise of ceremonial marriage
occurred in the mid-sixteenth century as both state and church for
various reasons sought to exert more control over intimate relation-
ships.28 One impetus for this phenomenon was urbanization and the
more frequent encounter with strangers.29 When couples lived their
lives primarily in a relatively small community, their conduct alone
sufficed to communicate that others could treat them as an economic
and social unit. Those who needed to know individuals' marital status
knew it, which made a formal ceremony generally unimportant.
In the intervening five hundred years, formal marriage has taken
on powerful symbolic significance as a public expression of partners'
commitment to a shared intimate life with one another.3 0 For this
23 See William G. Axinn & Arland Thornton, The Relationship Between Cohabitation
and Divorce: Selectivity or Causal Influence?, 29 DEMOGRAP"y 357, 357-58 (1992); Lee A.
Lillard et al., Premarital Cohabitation and Subsequent Marital Dissolution: A Matter of Self-
Selection?, 32 DEMOGRAPHY 437, 438 (1995).
24 SeeAxinn & Thornton, supra note 23, at 358-72; Nock, supra note 8, at 54-55,
Smock & Gupta, supra note 2, at 8.
25 See Nock, supra note 8, at 65-67; Judith Treas & Deirdre Giesen, Sexual Infidel-
ity Among Married and Cohabiting Americans, 62 J. MARmRAE & FAMu. 48, 59 (2000);
WAITE, supra note 8.
26 WAITE, supra note 8.
27 See GRArF, supra note 9, at 193-95.
28 See id. at 195-203.
29 See id. at 200.
30 This ascendance of a widely accepted companionate marriage in the last cen-
tury and a half or so has been an important influence in promoting this understand-
ing. See CARL N. DEGLER, AT ODDS: WOMEN AND THE FAMILY IN AMERia FROM "ft-E
REVOLUTION TO THE PRESENT 8-25 (1980); KAREN LYSTRA, SEARCHING Thw HEART: WNo.
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reason, the cultural meaning of cohabitation is different than it was
prior to the rise of ceremonial marriage. Given the current social sig-
nificance, of marriage, it is reasonable to assume that those who live
together without marrying at least have reservations about making the
kind of commitment that a formal ceremony would express.
It may appear more plausible to claim that those who cohabit
want the substantive equivalent of marriage without the traditional
gender roles that are so closely associated with that institution. Part-
ners' relative equality of earning power, for instance, enhances the
stability of cohabitation but reduces it for marriage.31 Nonetheless,
both cohabiting and married couples adopt a gendered division of
labor in which women perform more housework than men, although
the gap is narrower for unmarried partners.3 2 Thus, co-residence,
rather than formal marriage, seems to be what triggers an uneven allo-
cation of domestic responsibilities.33
Furthermore, the last few decades have witnessed the dismantling
of the legal system that served formally to reinforce traditional gender
roles within marriage.3 4 This, of course, is not to deny that many
spouses continue to adhere to such roles out of custom and informal
expectations. Entry into the formal status of marriage, however, gen-
erally does not subject partners to a legal regime that promotes such
behavior, nor does avoidance of that status ensure that the relation-
ship will be egalitarian. This is all the more true in light of the fact
that more cohabiting couples are having children together, since the
arrival of a child militates powerfully toward a traditional diision of
labor within the household.3 5 As a result, it seems difficult to claim
that cohabiting couples represent committed partners who differ
from spouses only in their departure from conventional gender roles.
mEN, MEN, AND Ro rrIc LoVE IN N ETEEN-H-CENTuRy A.mRIGIu 192-226 (1989);
ELAINE TYLER MAY, GREAT EXPECrATIONS: MIARRIACE AN DivORCE IN PoST-"'Tont,
AirCmiA 60-72 (1980).
31 SeeJulie Brines & KaraJoyner, The Ties That Bind: Pinciples of Cohesion in Cohab-
itation and Marriag4 64 AM. Soc. REv. 333, 350 (1999).
32 See Sanjiv Gupta, The Effects of Transitions in Marital Status on Men's Performance
of Housework, 61J. MARRIAGE & Fi. 700, 707 (1999); ScottJ. South & Glenna Spitze,
Housework in Afarital and Nonmarital Housdiolds, 59 AM. Soc. RE%,. 327, 327-44 (1994).
33 See Gupta, supra note 32, at 710.
34 See David L. Chambers, What If?: The Legal Consequences of Alariage and tie Legal
Needs of Lesbian and Gay Male Couples, 95 MICH. L RE%. 447,453-54 (1996); Milton C.
Regan, Jr., Mariage at thl Millennium, 33 FAvi. L.Q. 647, 656 (1999).
35 "A recent survey found that fully two-thirds of Americans believe it would be
best for women to stay home and care for family and children." Jo,, Wi.tS, U.-
BENDDnG GENDEm Wky FA~Nuy AND WORK CONFICT AND WtvAT TO Do ABOLr IT 2
(2000).
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In sum, it appears unpersuasive to argue that full legal institution-
alization of cohabitation is warranted because cohabitors differ from
spouses only in the relatively trivial respect that they have failed to
obtain a marriage certificate. Cohabitors are not just people who are
married in substance but not in form. They generally are less commit-
ted, and their relationships are less stable, than those who are mar-
ried. If this difference is socially important, it is reasonable for the law
to treat couples who are married differently than those who are not.
B. Commitment and Private Ordering
Perhaps, however, comparable treatment of married and unmar-
ried couples should rest on another foundation: the claim that the
level of partners' intimate commitment should not be a matter of state
concern. Individuals may desire a range of different types of relation-
ships, none of which should be favored by law. Having children may
provide greater justification for encouraging stable relationships, but
that concern applies regardless of the marital status of the couple. On
this view, comparable treatment of cohabiting and married couples
expresses respect for individual autonomy and privacy in the selection
of intimate partners. Indeed, cohabitation embodies the movement
toward greater private ordering in intimate life, in contrast with a
traditional status-based legal regime based on marriage.
1. Commitment
The first response to this claim is that society has a legitimate
interest in promoting intimate commitment between adults, regard-
less of whether the relationship also involves children. I have made
this argument at greater length elsewhere and so will only briefly reca-
pitulate it here.36
I begin with a powerful fundamental value of modern liberal soci-
ety: individual authenticity.37 Three concepts cluster around this
value. The first is what we might call self-fidelity. "to thine own self be
true," in Polonius's words.3 8 Each of us has a unique identity and po-
36 See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Law, Marriage, and Intimate Commitment, 9 VA. J. Soc.
PoL'Y & L. (forthcoming Fall 2001).
37 See generally IsArAi BERLIN, THE RooTS OF RoMAImcisSM 139-43 (1999)
(describing the profound effect on modem Western culture of romanticism, for
which "the greatest virtue of all" is authenticity); CHARLES TAYLOR, THE ETmicS OF
AutHENrricrnr (1991) (analyzing the implicit moral foundations of authenticity); Lio6
NEL TRILLING, SINCERITY AND AuTHECnITy (1972) (tracing the evolution in Western
moral life from sincerity to authenticity as crucial value).
38 WILLIAM SHAKESPEARE, HAMLET act 1, sc. 3.
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tential that we should strive to attain.3 9 The second concept is auton-
omy, the idea that human beings can be self-governing. I am true to
myself when my life is shaped by my own wishes and values rather than
by the unreflective acceptance of others. 40
Finally, individual authenticity involves integrity. This requires
that a person remain true to her principles or commitments in the
face of temptation to do otherwise. Integrity thus involves consis-
tency. An individual needs to harmonize her values so that she can
live life without being constantly pulled in different directions. Fur-
ther, she needs to be willing to act in accordance with those ,values.4'
Integrity is complementary to self-fidelity and autonomy. A person
who tries to be true to herself values integrity, because it helps her
resist acting in a way that does not reflect her deep sense of self. An
autonomous person seeks to live with integrity, because it helps to har-
monize her values into principles of self-governance.
Authenticity and the set of ideals that cluster around it require a
sense of the continuity and stability of the self over time. Self-fidelity
requires a coherent self to whom one can be true. The aspiration to
autonomy assumes a self who can establish standards to govern her
behavior in a variety of circumstances, rather than one who is "radi-
cally situated"42 and moved only by immediate impulse. Finally, the
harmonization of values and of beliefs and behavior that characterizes
integrity implies a self that establishes limits on what she will do on the
ground that some conduct is inconsistent with who she is. Without
this stability, as Lynne McFall puts it, "there would be nothing to fear
the loss of, not because we are safe but because we have nothing to
lose."43 Self-fidelity, autonomy, and integrity thus contribute to a
sense of individual stability and are predicated upon its existence.
The ability to make and keep commitments is critical to the unity
of the self over time. Commitment reflects the intention to restrict
future possible courses of action for the sake of values that one re-
gards as especially important. It means that one is not receptive in an
undifferentiated fashion to all possibilities available in all circum-
39 As Charles Taylor puts it, "Being true to myself means being true to my own
originality, and that is something only I can articulate and discover. In articulating it,
I am also defining myself. I am realizing a potentiality that is properly my own." T,%Y-
LOR, supra note 37, at 29.
40 For an account of the evolution of autonomy as a core Western concern, seeJ.
B. SCHN-vEIND, THE INVE MON OF AtrroNoiY (1998).
41 See generally Lynne McFall, Integrii,, 98 Emucs 5, 6 (1987) (describing the im-
portance of an authentic relationship to one's chosen principles).
42 MICHAELJ. SANDEL, LIBERALIS.M AND THE LIMirrs OFJusTICE 21 (1982).
43 McFall, supra note 41, at 20.
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stances, but is responsive to experience in terms of its significance -for
what we care about. Indeed, commitments help bestow that signifi-
cance, making possible the understanding of oneself as a unique pro-
tagonist in a coherent narrative that gives meaning to what otherwise
would be a series of discrete random events. Commitments thus are
what Lynne McFall calls "identity-conferring."4 4 As she puts it, "they
reflect what we take to be most important and so determine, to a large
extent, our [moral] identities."45 In this way, the foreclosure of possi-
bility that commitment represents is the precondition of agency. The
adoption of constraints on action ironically makes possible a sense of
individual freedom.
Among our most profound commitments, of course, are those to
other people. In particular, romantic intimacy, at least in Western
contemporary society, is regarded as a relationship that engages iden-
tity in an especially deep way.46 The relationship between identity and
intimacy is expressed by Anthony Giddens, who notes the strong hold
of the idea of romantic love as "an odyssey, in which self-identity awaits
its validation from the discovery of the other."47 Because of this role
of intimacy in fostering authenticity, intimate commitment enjoys a
privileged status among the various kinds of commitments that we
may make. In sum, there is a powerful claim that society should pro-
mote commitment as a valuable good, because it is essential to realiza-
tion of the deeply-rooted aspiration that individuals lead lives that
they can call their own.
Even if we accept a role for law in promoting intimate commit-
ment, are we justified in privileging marriage as the form that such
commitment should take? One may argue that what gives meaning to
intimate allegiances is not the assumption of a formal legal status, but
the personal choice to commit to another. If that is so, then law should
ratify the intimate choices that people make, married or unmarried,
rather than holding up one particular form of commitment as the
ideal.
Choice per se does not bestow value upon alternatives, however,
nor does it play any role in constructing an authentic identity. The
sense that the choices one makes have significance-that they mat-
ter-depends on the existence of a social background that designates
what is of value.48 These values are diverse and sometimes incommen-
44 I& at 13.
45 IHL
46 See IRVING SINGER, TImE PuRsurr OF LoVE 66 (1994).
47 ANTHONY GIDDENS, THE TRANSFORMATrION OF INTIMACY. SExuAITY, LOVE AND
EROTIcisM IN MODERN SocIErIEs 45 (1992).
48 See TAYLOR, supra note 37, at 37.
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surable. A person's choices among them have implications for her
identity, because they reflect her own distinctive evaluation, ordering,
and attempted reconciliation of values that she regards as having inde-
pendent value. Making difficult choices is character-forming, because
it represents confrontation with the pull of obligations whose force we
cannot control solely by ourselves. By contrast, a person for whom
things assume value simply by virtue of her own flat could always dis-
solve any dilemma merely by proclaiming that one of the alternatives
no longer possesses any significance.
For intimate commitment to be constitutive of identity thus re-
quires that it be seen as something that derives its value from a source
outside the self's choice to engage in it.49 It requires, in other words,
social validation. The legal institution of marriage pla)s an especially
significant role in providing such validation for the value of commit-
ment. It bestows a legal status on partners that is the basis for imper-
sonal rights and obligations. Those who marry participate in a public
ritual that marks entry into a social institution that is intended to em-
body the value of intimate commitment. That institution transcends
any specific couple who may be a part of it and has a history that
dwarfs any couple's particular experience. Marriage is not static; un-
derstandings of the proper role of wives, for instance, have shifted
dramatically over the past generation and are still the focus of conten-
tion.50 Nonetheless, marriage offers a reasonably coherent set of ex-
pectations and traditions about commitment that aids in the
construction of a narrative identity both for each partner and for the
couple together. Indeed, this role of marriage is reflected in the fact
that many gay and lesbian critics argue that denying same-sex couples
the right to marry is injurious, precisely because it deprives such
couples of this social acknowledgment of the value of their intimate
commitments. 51
The first response to the claim that respect for private ordering of
intimate relationships justifies legal institutionalization of cohabita-
49 See STE.PHEN L. DARWALL, htPARTtAL. REASON 165 (1983) ("That which endows
our life with meaning must be something whose value we regard as self-transcen-
dent."); see alsoJEFrzn' BLUSTEIN, CARE AND CO.MMTM.iENT 42-60 (1991) (discussing
the importance of impersonal value to the significance of what we care about).
50 See generally WInUAms, supra note 35 (arguing that the models of ideal worker"
and "marginalized caregiver" prevent both men and women from experiencing work
and family as they would like).
51 See, e.g., BarbaraJ. Cox, But 111y Not Afaniage? An Essay on Vertnont's Civil Un-
ions Law, Same-Sex Marriage, and Separate But (Un)Equa4 25 VT. L REx. 113, 136-47
(2000).
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tion, therefore, is that society is justified in promoting commitment by
favoring marriage.
2. Private Ordering
The second response is that the private ordering that cohabita-
tion involves increasingly has been eroded in several respects. For
some purposes, cohabitation has taken on the character of a status,
while marriage provides greater opportunity for couples to arrange
their lives as they wish. Cohabitors who wish to make financial claims
on their partner when their relationship ends, or to receive certain
benefits as a family member of their partner, generally must convince
a court that their relationship is or was the substantive equivalent of
marriage.5 2 Courts, as a formal matter, tend to frame the inquiry in
cases involving financial awards as whether a contract between the
parties gave rise to the expectation of such assistance.53 As the ALI
project on family dissolution has observed, however, many courts
appear to vindicate an equitable rather than a contractual principle.
That is, having concluded that a particular set of facts demands a
remedy, they may stretch ordinary contract principles to fit the rem-
edy within a contractual rubric. This result is not surprising. Parties
may share their lives for many years without having any clear agree-
ment, express or implied, that sets out the financial consequences
that would follow from the decision by one of them to terminate
their relationship. To find such an agreement may therefore re-
quire filling many gaps with terms that follow more from the court's
sense of fairness than from any mutual intentions inferable from
the parties' conduct.54
In short, the law tends to treat cohabitation between intimate
partners as akin to a status. That is, persons who live together in a
relationship that involves financial and emotional interdependency
are given rights and are subject to obligations by operation of law,
even in the absence of explicit consent by the partners.
, The ALI proposal suggests that the law in this area should explic-
itly acknowledge its reliance on status, so that "property claims and
support obligations presumptively arise between persons who qualify
as domestic partners, as they do between legal spouses ... The
determination whether an unmarried couple is a domestic partner-
ship depends on whether the couple "for a significant period of time
52 See infra text accompanying notes 62-68.
53 See, e.g., Marvin v. Marvin, 557 P.2d 106, 112-13 (Cal. 1976).
54 ALI PRrNciPL.s (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. b.
55 Id.
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share[d] a primary residence and a life together as a couple."s 6
Whether they are deemed to have shared a life together must be de-
termined "by reference to all the circumstances,"37 which includes
consideration of thirteen different factors.58
Conceptualizing cohabitation as a status reflects two wa)s in
which private ordering has become circumscribed for nonmarital
partners. First, an individual cannot avoid a financial obligation to his
or her partner simply by avoiding marriage. The presumption is that
domestic partners have assumed certain responsibilities toward one
another, which will be imposed unless explicitly disavowed. By con-
trast, at the time Marvin v. Marvin;9 was decided, the presumption was
that unmarried partners had no obligations toward one another, un-
less they had affirmatively embraced them.60 Only spouses were as-
sumed to have agreed to financial sharing.61 The default rule for
cohabitors, in other words, now tends to mirror the rule that governs
spouses. As a result, the absence of formal legal status does not neces-
sarily mean the absence of de facto status.
Second, in order to bring a claim successfully, a partner must es-
tablish that the cohabitation was the substantive equivalent of mar-
riage. This requires that unmarried couples conform to conventional
cultural norms about appropriate marital behavior. Thus, for in-
stance, factors that the ALI regards as relevant in determining
whether individuals "shared a life together as a couple" include con-
siderations such as "the extent to which the parties intermingled their
finances,"62 "[t]he extent to which their relationship fostered the par-
ties' economic interdependence, or the economic dependence of one
party upon the other,"6 3 "[tihe extent to which the parties engaged in
conduct and assumed specialized or collaborative roles in furtherance
of their life together,"6 and "[t]he emotional or physical intimacy of
the parties' relationship." 65
Similarly, the NewYork Court of Appeals, in Braschi v. StahlAssod-
ates Co.,66 concluded that a same-sex partner should be considered a
56 I& § 6.03(1).
57 Id. § 6.03(7).
58 Id. § 6.03(7)(a)-(m).
59 557 P.2d 106 (Cal. 1976).
60 Id. at 116.
61 See id. at 118.
62 ALI PmcEdnLs (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 1, § 6.03(7) (b).
63 Id. § 6.03(7)(c).
64 Id. § 6.03(7) (d).
65 Id- § 6.03(7)(h).
66 543 N.E.2d 49 (N.Y. 1989).
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"family member" of the deceased and therefore entitled to remain in
the latter's rent-controlled apartment, because the couple lived in a
household "having all of the normal familial characteristics. '67 In
general, the court said, such characteristics include "the exclusivity
and longevity of the relationship, the level of emotional and financial
commitment, the manner in which the parties have conducted their
everyday lives and held themselves out to society, and the reliance
placed upon one another for daily family services." 68
By contrast, those who are married may organize their lives as
they wish and still automatically receive the benefits (and incur the
obligations) associated with that status. A husband can, for instance,
work in another city during the week and reside with his wife only on
the weekends and still be treated as a spouse. A married couple may
maintain strictly separate financial accounts, or not practice sexual ex-
clusivity, and will still be regarded as married for legal purposes. Un-
married cohabitors, therefore, generally must live consistently with
mainstream understandings of appropriate marital behavior in order
to receive certain legal benefits. By contrast, those who formally as-
sume marital status have the freedom to arrange their intimate lives as
they wish without fear of jeopardizing the benefits flowing from
marriage.
Married parents enjoy similar latitude in their enjoyment of pa-
rental benefits. An unmarried biological father seeking custody of or
visitation with a child, for instance, or a voice in the decision to place
the child with an adoptive family, must demonstrate that he has con-
sistently maintained a meaningful relationship with the child in order
to assert any legal right that attaches to parenthood. 69 A father mar-
ried to his child's mother, however, is automatically entitled at divorce
to consideration for custody and visitation rights, and his consent
must be obtained prior to the adoption of the child.70 This is so re-
gardless of whether he has had meaningful involvement in his child's
life (unless his lack of involvement is so egregious that he is deemed
to have abandoned the child).71
Law, therefore, should be free to favor marriage over cohabita-
tion and should not blur the distinction between the two kinds of rela-
tionships. Does that mean that unmarried couples should receive
none of the benefits available to spouses? Should the desire to avoid
67 Id at 54.
68 Id at 55 (citations omitted).
69 Lehr v. Robertson, 463 U.S. 248, 266-67 (1983).
70 MARGARET M. MAHONEY, STEPFAMILIES AND THE LAW 163-64 (1994).
71 See, e.g., Ex parte C.V., No. 1981316, 2000 WL 1717011 (Ala. Nov. 17, 2000).
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eroding allegiance to marriage lead to rejection of any claims by un-
married partners that are not based on explicit contractual
agreement?
II. QuAIu=iE RECOGNITION
Categorical denial of claims by domestic partners seems no less
problematic than eliminating the distinction between married and un-
married couples. There may be reasons for recognizing claims by un-
married partners that on balance are weightier than the fear that
doing so may lessen the distinctive status of marriage. We need to
think carefully about the rationales for the extension or denial of
comparable legal treatment of cohabitation and marriage, focusing
on both the practical and symbolic significance of such treatment in
particular situations.72
Before addressing some of the specific benefits that should be
subject to this analysis, we need to think about what criteria should
guide our deliberation. I propose the following. In general, we
should acknowledge claims when failing to do so risks leaving one
partner in an interdependent relationship seriously vulnerable or dis-
advantaged because of her reliance on the other, particularly when
the relationship has ended. We also should recognize legal rights
when the party. seeking those rights wishes to use them to assume re-
sponsibility for the care of his or her partner, In addition, we should
extend legal protection to children who othenise might be injured by
the law's denial of parental rights and benefits based on the absence
of marital status. At the same time, we reasonably may prefer married
couples over unmarried ones with respect to matters such as adoption
and foster care. This is justified because of the greater stability of mar-
ried as opposed to unmarried couples and the absence of a partner's
preexisting relationship with a child.
Furthermore, we generally should be skeptical about comparable
legal treatment of married and unmarried couples when denial of
benefits to the latter would not impose hardship on a partner who has
become vulnerable by virtue of her reliance on the relationship. In
some cases, for instance, unmarried partners seek to be treated as
spouses, because this would provide them with benefits on more ad-
vantageous terms than othenvise are available. The fact that they are
unwilling to assume the responsibilities and burdens that are imposed
on couples who marry, however, weighs against recognizing their
claims. This is because these couples represent less than the full com-
72 My discussion in this Part focuses on many of the legal benefits described in
Chambers, supra note 34, at 452-85, and Baker v. State, 744 A.2d 864, 884 (VL 1999).
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mitment, for better or worse, that marriage is meant to involve, Fi-
nally, we may want to reject claims by unmarried partners when
extension of a right currently reserved to spouses would leave uncer-
tainty about who is entitled to the right and would create potential for
its abuse.
These are broad guidelines, which serve only as provisional rules
of thumb. They underscore, however, that, ceteris paribus, law should
be most willing to extend legal recognition of or protection for cohab-
itation when doing so reinforces an ethic of care and commitment in
intimate relationships. What are the implications of this approach for
specific issues relating to the legal treatment of cohabitation? The
discussion that follows offers some answers to this question. My inten-
tion is not to offer a definitive resolution of these issues, but to suggest
how we might go about identifying and weighing the considerations
that are relevant with respect to particular claims by domestic
partners.
A. Inter Se Claims
Consider the first category of cases, which involves claims by one
partner against another. The most significant of these deals with the
allocation of property and financial support between the partners. If
a claimant can establish that the relationship involved financial and
emotional interdependence, the law should recognize that the vulner-
ability and reliance that necessarily result in such cases militate toward
recognition of the claim. As a practical matter, given the substantial
number of persons who cohabit at one time or another, refusal to
recognize a cause of action could inflict significant hardship upon a
considerable number of people. Many of them are likely to be wo-
men, because they are the ones in unmarried relationships who tend
to make more financial sacrifices and are less able to convince their
partners to marry.73 As a symbolic matter, declining to recognize
claims would send the message that by refusing to marry one can es-
cape the responsibilities that flow from intimate relationships. While I
have acknowledged that it is legitimate for law to take into account the
legal form of a relationship in assigning rights and benefits, denying
financial claims between unmarried partners would elevate form over
substance to an unacceptable degree.
Related to that point, the ALI is right to suggest that the basis for
recovery in these instances should be the fact that persons have lived
together as domestic partners, rather than express or even implicit
73 See Grace Ganz Blumberg, Cohabitation Without Marriage: A Different Perspective,
28 UCLA L. REv. 1125, 1163, 1168-69 (1981).
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contract theory.74 The important consideration is that individuals
may have responsibilities of care toward one another that arise not
simply from consent but by virtue of a shared life, whatever legal form
it takes. Even if relying on contract doctrine may produce a similar
result in most cases, the rhetoric of that doctrine is resolutely individu-
alist rather than relational. By contrast, to base recovery on what the
ALI calls a "status classification"75 reflects "the familiar principle that
legal rights and obligations may arise from the conduct of parties ith
respect to one another, even though they have created no formal doc-
ument or agreement setting forth such an undertaking."76
Another instance requiring us to decide whether law should
honor the claim of one unmarried partner against the other arises
when one of the partners dies. When a spouse dies without providing
in his will for any inheritance for his spouse, most states authorize the
surviving spouse to claim a "forced" share of the estate, ranging from
one-third to one-half.77 No such provision benefits a similarly situated
surviving unmarried partner. Should it? Answering this question is a
bit more complicated than addressing the issue of financial awards
upon dissolution of the relationship. On the one hand, if the part-
ners had a common financial and emotional life together, the survivor
likely would expect to share some or all of the estate in case of the
other person's death. Indeed, she may well have made sacrifices that
enhanced the value of that estate. As I have suggested, if the couple
separated by choice, she should be entitled to an equitable share of
the available assets. Why should it be any different if they separate by
death?
On the other hand, unlike the case of ordinary separation, the
deceased partner has not attempted to withhold benefits from his
partner for the purpose of maximizing his own wealth. He has instead
established certain priorities among those persons with whom he feels
some emotional bond. The exclusion of his partner from the will sug-
gests that the relationship perhaps was not as emotionally significant
as the claimant may eventually suggest. There is more reason to re-
gard this exclusion as a genuine expression of the relative importance
of the relationship to the deceased than to give credence to how a
relationship is described by a partner who is seeking to minimize his
duties at the time a couple separates. Furthermore, the other partner
may be on notice of his choice, which means that she could not rea-
74 See ALI Pwn'cn's (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 1, § 6.03 cint. b.
75 I.
76 Id. § 6.02 cmt. a.
77 See Chambers, supra note 34, at 479.
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sonably expect to share in the estate in the event of death. If she is
not aware of the choice, that itself may be a telling commentary on
the nature of the relationship.
Arguments based on the need to vindicate an ethic of care arising
from interdependence thus seem less compelling in this case than
with respect to financial awards upon dissolution. The most persua-
sive rationale for extending the benefit to an unmarried partner is the
avoidance of undue financial hardship. This suggests, perhaps, that a
qualified domestic partner be entitled to a forced share only upon a
showing that failure to honor the claim would impose undue hard-
ship. Thus, the standard would be similar to that required under the
Uniform Premarital Agreement Act for declining to enforce the terms
of a premarital contract that modify or eliminate spousal support.7"
How should we respond when the question is whether an unmar-
ried partner should be given any share of the estate by statute when
her partner dies without a will? 79 In this case, we obviously have no
indication by the deceased that he did not wish to prevent his partner
from being able to inherit from him. The mere failure to prepare a
will, by itself, does not necessarily give rise to such an inference, since
it is not uncommon for people to put off the preparation of a will. An
important purpose of an intestacy statute is to reflect the deceased's
likely wishes regarding the disposition of his or her estate, based on
assumptions about the relative importance of various relationships in
his or her life. If a person can establish that she was a domestic part-
ner, it seems reasonable to assume that the deceased would have given
her preference in his will had he made his wishes explicit.
A countervailing consideration is that an intestacy statute also ex-
presses society's views about the value of various relationships and
that, as I have suggested, there is reason to give priority to marriage
among intimate relationships. If two persons who are romantic com-
panions choose not to marry, one may argue that if they want to in-
herit from each other, they should make their wishes explicit in a will.
In addition, one could anticipate that opening the door to claims by
unmarried partners might generate numerous disputes among those
asserting entitlement to a portion of the estate. The arguments sur-
rounding this issue make resolving it more difficult than when a part-
ner has deliberately chosen to exclude the other partner from her
will. On balance, it seems fairer to recognize that many people fail to
make or to change a will and that a domestic partner who has shared a
78 UNIF. PREMARrrAL AGREEMENT AcT § 6(b), 9B U.L.A. 376 (1987).
79 For a description of benefits made available to spouses in such circumstances,
see Chambers, supra note 34, at 455-56.
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life with the deceased should not be penalized for her companion's
failure.
B. Assuming Responsibility
A second category of cases are those in which one member of an
unmarried couple seeks the opportunity to assume responsibility for
decisions relating to care of the other. Laws designate, for instance,
those who are authorized to make medical decisions for someone
when she becomes incompetent and who may make decisions in that
situation with respect to matters such as choice of residence and fi-
nancial transactions.80 If a party has not indicated who should exer-
cise authority in these cases, statutes typically look first to a spouse and
then to blood relatives to take on this role.81 If a domestic partner is
willing to accept responsibility for making such decisions, the author-
ity to do so is not so much a benefit that an unmarried companion
seeks to obtain as it is a burden that she is willing to bear. Permitting
her to do so would acknowledge the importance of care and commit-
ment in intimate relationships, which is the value that underlies a gen-
eral preference for marriage.
Furthermore, as David Chambers has observed, the rationale for
vesting decisionmaking power in a spouse is that this individual is
"more likely than any other person to know what decisions the incom-
petent person would have made if she were now able to decide for
herself or, alternatively, at least to be the person most concerned
about the incompetent person's welfare."82 That is, a major concern
in these cases is accuracy. the decisions made should most closely ap-
proximate those the incompetent person would make based on famili-
arity with her values and wishes. For these reasons, it seems
appropriate to leave open the possibility that a person who establishes
that she is a domestic partner of the incompetent person will be able
to make decisions on his behalf.
A related issue is the ability to take leave to care for an ill partner
under the Family and Medical Leave Act.83 The Act requires that cer-
tain employers grant unpaid leave for up to twelve work weeks a year
to employees to care for a spouse, parent, or child with a "serious
health condition."8 4 It provides for no leave, however, to care for an
unmarried partner. Should it? As with the desire to assume decision-
80 See UNIF. PROBATE CODE §§ 5-305(c), 5409(a), 8 U.LA. 466, 487-S8 (1983).
81 See Chambers, supra note 34, at 455.
82 I& at 456.
83 See 29 U.S.C. §§ 2601-2654 (1994).
84 Id. §§ 2611-2654, 2612 (a) (1) (c) (1994).
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making responsibility for an incompetent partner, there is a good ar-
gument that seeking to obtain this benefit reflects a willingness to take
on the burdens that flow from intimate commitment to another per-
son. This willingness, along with the likelihood that the ill person may
have no caregiver more attentive and faithful than her domestic part-
ner, militates in favor of amending the Act to include the provision of
care for an unmarried partner as a basis for leave.
C. Children
A third category of cases in which the issue of comparable treat-
ment of married and unmarried persons arises deals with relation-
ships in which there are children. A person married to someone with
a child not from the marriage is regarded by the law as a stepparent.
He does not have the full panoply of parental rights unless he adopts
the child,85 but in some cases stepparent status is the basis for benefits
flowing to him or to the child. The Family and Medical Leave Act, for
instance, permits a worker to take leave to care for a stepchild. 0
Should it enable an unmarried partner to take leave to care for the
child of a companion? There is a good argument that if the adult is
willing to assume the responsibility for providing such care, the law
should encourage this by enabling him or her to take leave under the
Act for this purpose. Another example of parental rights and respon-
sibilities flowing from marriage involves the use of reproductive tech-
nology. When a husband consents to the insemination of his wife,
that consent alone is sufficient for the law to treat him as the resulting
child's father, even though he has no biological relationship to it.87
By contrast, an unmarried male who consents to his partner's insemi-
nation in these circumstances does not thereby attain this status. 8
His consent, however, reflects a -willingness not only to receive the
benefits of legal parenthood, but also to assume its significant respon-
sibilities and burdens. Granting rights and imposing obligations in
this setting would acknowledge the importance of this attitude in pro-
moting the welfare of children.
In other instances, directly promoting the welfare of the child
seems a good reason for according comparable treatment to married
and unmarried partners. State workers compensation and federal So-
cial Security survivors benefit law, for instance, provide that a minor
85 See generally MAHONEY, supra note 70, at 161 ("The process of adoption creates
the full parent-child status between the adopting stepparent and the stepchild.").
86 29 U.S.C. §§ 2611(12), 2612(a)-(d) (1994).
87 See, e.g., In reMarriage of Buzzanca, 72 Cal. Rptr. 2d 280, 291 (Ct. App. 1998).
88 See Dunkin v. Boskey, 98 Cal. Rptr. 2d 44, 55 (Ct. App. 2000).
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stepchild living with and dependent upon a stepparent is eligible to
receive benefits to replace lost income resulting from the stepparent's
death.8 9 The child's eligibility, in other words, depends upon the rela-
tionship between the adults. If, however, a child must establish actual
prior economic dependency upon an adult resident of the household
in order to receive benefits, there seems no reason to permit recovery
if the child is dependent upon an adult married to her parent but to
deny it if the adult is not. Even if we consider it appropriate to ex-
press society's preference for marriage through different treatment of
married and unmarried couples, we should not compromise chil-
dren's welfare as the price for doing so in this situation. If an adult
partner has assumed the responsibility of helping support a child and
the child has relied on that support, the vulnerability that results from
the adult's death supports recognizing a child's claim for benefits to
replace the lost income.
Similarly, if an unmarried partner has developed an attachment
to and relationship with a child living in the household, it generally is
in the child's interest that this partner be eligible to maintain that
relationship through visitation with the child if the adults separate.
Yet, in many states, a cohabitor has no standing to present such a
claim. 90 The traditional rule has been that any person not a biological
or legal parent of a child could not intervene in custody or visitation
matters at divorce without a showing that the parent uras unfit.91 This
approach disadvantages both married partners-that is, stepparents-
and cohabitors.
In recent years, several states have explicitly authorized steppar-
ents to present claims in custody and visitation proceedings at the
time of divorce.92 It is far less common, however, for unmarried part-
ners to have standing to do so when the adults' relationship ends. If,
however, the partner has a significant relationship with the child, it
seems unreasonable to base his ability to pursue continued contact
with the child on whether he has been married to the child's mother.
The ALI rejects reliance on marital status as the basis for deter-
mining standing in these situations. Section 2.04 of its Prindples of the
Law of Family Dissqlution provides for notice and right of participation
in custodial responsibility proceedings for both a legal parent and a
"de facto parent."93 The latter is defined as someone who for a signifi-
89 Chambers, supra note 34, at 464.
90 See MA4soNEY, supra note 70, at 129-37.
91 See, e.g., Petersen v. Rogers, 445 S.E.2d 901, 905-06 (N.C. 1994).
92 See ALI PRINcIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 1, § 2.04 Reporter's
Notes, cmt. d (discussing cases under this principle).
93 Id § 2.04(1)(c).
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cant period has resided with the child and, with the legal parent's
consent, has performed at least as much of the caretaking functions
for the child as has the legal parent.94 The relative weight that a legal
and a de facto parent's interest should receive is subject to some disa-
greement and warrants more elaborate discussion than I can provide
here. The important point for my purposes is that, however the bal-
ance is struck, it seems inappropriate that only stepparents are eligible
for de facto parent status and that everyone else is categorically ex-
cluded. The interest of the child in continuing the relationship with
the de facto parent should at least be taken into account, whatever the
de facto parent's relationship with the legal parent. An unmarried
cohabitor who is willing to sustain that relationship and the responsi-
bilities that it entails should receive a hearing when he and his partner
agree to separate.
There are other issues dealing with children, however, where it is
reasonable to distinguish between married and unmarried partners.
Stepparents in most states are able to adopt a child of their spouse
without home visits and family studies that typically are required
before an adoption is approved.95 On one hand, the willingness of a
cohabitor to adopt reflects a commendable desire to provide the care
and to take on the considerable obligations that accompany legal
parenthood. On the other hand, however, there is a higher likeli-
hood that a cohabiting couple will separate than there is that a mar-
ried couple will divorce.9 6 This warrants a closer look at the
household before a partner is permitted to adopt. Bestowing adoptive
parenthood on an unmarried partner could make any dissolution pro-
cess more contentious, because each partner would have comparable
rights in a custody and visitation proceeding. By contrast, even if a
cohabitor is able to assert de facto parent status, the legal parent still is
given certain preferences that simplify the determination of custodial
rights and responsibilities.9 7 In general, this should produce more
predictability and less conflict, which is in the interest of children.
Such a consideration is of particular concern for children in house-
holds with unmarried partners because of the greater risk of disrup-
tion than exists for children in marital households. The home visit
and family study ultimately may preclude few cohabitors from adopt-
ing, but it affords an opportunity to make a more detailed assessment
94 1d. § 2.03(1) (c).
95 SeeJoan H. Hollinger, Introduction to ADOPTION LAW AND PRaar1CE § 1.05(2][a]
(Joan H. Hollinger ed., 1988).
96 See supra text accompanying notes 22-23.
97 For instance, a nonparent typically can obtain custody of a child only if the
natural or legal parent is deemed unfit. See MAHONEY, supra note 70, at 140-41.
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of the likely stability of the setting in which the partners plan to raise
the child.
The greater stability of married couples provides even greaterjus-
tification for favoring them in adoption and foster care selections.9 3
In these instances, there is no pre-existing relationship between part-
ner and child that needs to be taken into account. Here again, the
desire of an unmarried couple to assume responsibility for a child
through adoption or serving as foster parents is laudable, and such
couples will still have opportunities to do so. When a suitable married
couple is also available, however, the willingness of the spouses to
make a public commitment to one another and the comparative data
on stability9 9 militate toward favoring the married over the unmarried
couple.
D. Special Benefits
Distinguishing between spouses and cohabitors also seems appro-
priate in cases in which cohabitors seek treatment as a married couple
simply to obtain benefits othenvise unavailable or on more advanta-
geous terms. In such instances, partners seek the benefits of marital
status without its corresponding obligations. There are a variety of
burdens to which married couples are subject, but unmarried ones
generally are not. If spouses apply for certain government benefits,
such as Supplemental Security Income or welfare, the grant is lower
than if each partner had applied separately.10 0 In many cases, if only
one spouse applies for a needs-based benefit, the income of the other
is attributed to him or her.10 ' A spouse has the legal duty to pay for
necessaries, such as emergency medical care, provided to her partner
by third pardes, 10 2 but a cohabitor does not. In most community
property states, a creditor can collect a debt from a married couple's
community property, without regard to the contribution of that
spouse to acquisition of the property.103 In addition, spouses are sub-
ject to anti-nepotism provisions, while cohabitors generally are not.10'
Married couples must comply with divorce law in order to end their
relationship, but unmarried couples may separate on their own. In
these and other ways, marriage involves obligations that cohabitation
98 On such a preference, see Chambers, supra note 34, at 469-70, and citations
therein.
99 See supra text accompanying notes 22-26.
100 See Chambers, supra note 34, at 473-74 (citing 42 U.S.C. § 1382 (1994)).
101 R
102 IK at 484-85.
103 See id at 485.
104 See id. at 460.
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does not. For that reason, in the absence of other countervailing con-
siderations, unmarried partners should not necessarily be accorded
the advantages of marriage.
Thus, for instance, a gift from one spouse to another is exempt
from the federal gift tax.105 Cohabitors could obtain this benefit
through marriage, but have declined to do so. The law should take
them at their word that they do not wish to enter into the kind of
formal public commitment that marriage entails and should be able
to deny them this benefit of making such a commitment. It is unlikely
that unmarried partners have arranged their lives in expectation of
such a benefit and that either would be significantly disadvantaged
because of reliance on its anticipated availability.
Similarly, public and private employers make health care benefits
available to spouses of employees, 06 and a few states now require cer-
tain employers to extend health insurance to the otherwise uninsured
spouses of employees. 10 7 These spousal benefits are exempt from tax-
ation.108 Cohabitors asserting a claim to such benefits seek to invoke
their relationship as a source of individual advantage, while using
their unmarried status to avoid the burdens of marriage. Admittedly,
a valid consideration in these instances is the importance of wide-
spread availability of health insurance. In many cases, however, the
issue is not the absolute availability of health insurance, but the ability
to obtain it on more advantageous terms. Furthermore, it may well be
alppropriate in providing health insurance to shift emphasis away from
membership in an intimate relationship to access to insurance on an
individual basis. Reform efforts should focus directly on this change,
however, rather than on the comparable treatment of individuals in
relationships that generally feature different levels of commitment.
Additional policy considerations are relevant in deciding whether
to extend benefits to both married and unmarried couples in other
cases. For instance, a foreign national who marries an American citi-
zen has a presumptive right to enter the United States immediately as
a long-term resident.I0 9 Should one who cohabits with an American
citizen be entitled to the same treatment? Concerns about the integ-
rity of immigration law add weight to the refusal to do so. Even under
existing law, there is potential for abuse of this provision through a
"sham" marriage into which parties enter solely for the purpose of
105 See I.R.C. §§ 1041, 2523 (1994).
106 See Chambers, supra note 34, at 474.
107 Rd at 484 (citing HAW. REV. STAT. §§ 87-4, 393-7, 393-21 (1993)).
108 IL at 474 (citing I.R.C. §§ 105, 213 (1996)).
109 See 3 CHARLES GORDON ET AL., IMMIGRATION LAW AND PROCEDURE § 36.02 (rev.
ed. 2000).
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obtaining favorable immigration status. Such marriages will not be
recognized as sufficient to trigger long-term resident status. The Im-
migration and Naturalization Service (INS) is authorized to deter-
mine whether parties have entered into marriage in good faith, as
opposed to doing so in order to obtain an immigration benefit110
This task admittedly is difficult and perhaps even controversial in
some cases. When there is no formal marriage, it is even more vexing
and problematic. If a partner could obtain a benefit without assum-
ing the obligations of marriage, the INS likely would receive many
more applications than it does now. The agency would have to scruti-
nize every relationship intensively and pass judgment on whether the
partners possessed sufficient commitment to one another to justify
favorable immigration treatment. This would create the prospect of
inconsistent and unpredictable outcomes that could well undermine
the perceived fairness and integrity of the immigration laws.
A similar concern arises in deciding whether cohabitors should
be able to invoke the privilege for confidential communications that is
now available to spouses in civil and criminal proceedings. The privi-
lege protects from disclosure any communication during marriage be-
tween the parties that they intended to remain confidential, even after
the marriage is over. 1' On the one hand, respect for intimate rela-
tionships suggests that the state should not attempt to force disclosure
of such communications in a legal proceeding. Intrusion on the pri-
vacy of committed, unmarried partners may be just as damaging as
infringement on the privacy of spouses. This suggests that the under-
lying substance of the relationship, rather than its form, should be the
basis for protection.
Given the possibility that this privilege might reduce the prospect
of civil or criminal liability, however, the number of cohabitors who
would attempt to invoke it could be substantial. This would be prob-
lematic for two reasons. First, the court would have to conduct an in-
depth inquiry into every unmarried relationship that is asserted as the
basis for the privilege. As with a case-by-case inquiry by immigration
officials, this would increase the probability of contradictory and un-
predictable decisions. The ramifications of this may be especially seri-
ous, because inconsistent exclusion of evidence could erode
confidence in the ability of the legal system to arrive atjust decisions.
A second, and related, point is that evidentiary privileges are in-
tended to be a narrow exception to the rule that a tribunal should
110 See8 U.S.C. § 1255(e)(3) (Supp. V 1999).
111 See ilton C. Regan, Jr., Spousal Privilege and the Aeanings of Marriage, 81 ,. L
REv. 2045, 2055-56 (1995).
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have access to all relevant information. Making the communications
privilege available to unmarried partners would significantly expand
the body of evidence that potentially could be withheld from the legal
system. An individual would be able not only to invoke the privilege
with respect to the relationship in which he or she is currently in-
volved, but also to shield communications that occurred during ear-
lier relationships as well. The relevant figure for estimating the
potential impact of extending the privilege to cohabitors thus would
not be simply the percentage of the population cohabiting at a partic-
ular time, but the percentage who have ever cohabited. For these rea-
sons, it seems inadvisable to extend the privilege to unmarried
partners.
Another right currently available to spouses, but not cohabitors,
is the ability to sale for loss of consortium in the event of a negligent
injury to one's partner. This tort is meant to provide compensation
for "loss of conjugal society, comfort, affection, companionship and
sexual relations."'1 2 A partner in an unmarried, committed relation-
ship obviously can suffer such loss just as much as a marital partner.
Furthermore, unlike the other benefits I have discussed, such as tax
exemption, health insurance, immigration status, and evidentiary priv-
ilege, an unmarried partner attempting to assert this cause of action
does not have the option at the time she seeks the benefit of obtaining
it simply by marrying. Finally, just as I have suggested that financial
reliance by a cohabitor justifies receipt of benefits in certain cases, so
one might argue that emotional reliance supports the right to assert a
claim for the loss of companionship by an unmarried partner. Law, in
other words, should try to limit the vulnerability that arises from inti-
mate interdependence.
On the other hand, an important concern of tort law is to estab-
lish reasonable limits on the persons to whom a negligent defendant
owes a duty. As a result, "[t]he need to draw a bright line in this area
of the law is essential,"" 3 lest persons be subject to liability to an ex-
pansive group of claimants who are not entirely foreseeable. Marriage
obviously provides such a bright line. The proportion of people who
are married at any given time is considerably higher than those who
cohabit, which makes it relatively foreseeable that one who injures an
adult will also cause injury to the victim's spouse. In addition, the
possibility of obtaining substantial damages could substantially in-
crease the number of claims. This, of course, would require more
frequent case-by-case analysis of the emotional significance and dura-
112 Elden v. Sheldon, 758 P.2d 582, 588 (Cal. 1988).
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bility of intimate non-marital relationships. Finally, one might con-
tend that preserving this cause of action for spouses directly expresses
the message that marriage is a distinctive relationship that ideally in-
volves the highest degree of commitment.
The arguments on each side of this issue are strong ones, which
makes its resolution especially difficult. One way to give some weight
to each may be to preserve a loss of consortium claim for spouses, but
to permit an unmarried partner who witnesses injury to his or her
companion to bring an action for negligent infliction of emotional
distress. This would be consistent with the expansion in recent years
of the class of persons authorized to bring a lawsuit. NewJersey, for
instance, has recognized a cause of action for distress for an engaged
partner who was present at the death of her fianc. 114 This "by-
stander" liability is narrower than liability for the loss of consortium,
since the claimant must witness the injury in question."1 By contrast,
a spouse who sues for loss of consortium is presumed to have suffered
injury simply by virtue of the fact that her marital partner has been
injured or killed, regardless of whether she was present at the
event. 1 6 Viewed from the legal fiction of foreseeability, it is reasona-
bly foreseeable that a defendant who injures someone who is with a
companion will also cause emotional distress to that companion, par-
ticularly given the growing ranks of cohabiting partners. It is far more
foreseeable, however, that someone who injures an unaccompanied
person will also inflict injury on an absent spouse than on an absent
unmarried partner.
Im. Do -ric PARTNER REGISTRATION
I have suggested with respect to some benefits that the difficulty
and unpredictability of case-by-case identification of eligible domestic
partners is one factor that militates against extension of spousal bene-
fits to cohabitors. One way to avoid this problem would be to permit
unmarried couples to register as domestic partners if they wished to
be treated comparably to spouses for certain purposes. Somejurisdic-
tions make certain public benefits available to couples who register.117
Others furnish registration only as a step that may qualify partners for
some private benefits, such as doverage under private employer health
insurance policies."18
114 Dunphy v. Gregor, 642 A.2d 372, 380 (NJ. 1994).
115 See id.
116 See Gonen, supra note 13, at 341.
117 Id.
118 See id.
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Treating registration as a device simply to obtain rights and bene-
fits, without any corresponding responsibilities, is at odds with the
idea that domestic partners warrant some degree of special treatment,
because they are committed to one another. Furthermore, it seems
likely that at least some persons would register who would not deserve
such favorable treatment, since registering would have no disadvan-
tages, because it triggers no obligations.
One way to address this concern would be to provide that domes-
tic partners who register would receive some, but not all, of the bene-
fits of marriage and would be subject to some, but not all, of the
responsibilities that spouses assume. Couples who desire a more lim-
ited commitment than marriage would be able to take advantage of
this alternative. Registration would reflect a more explicit willingness
to assume the status of cohabitor, in contrast to courts' current ten-
dency to infer such an agreement from the conduct of the parties.' 19
One might argue that this system would take account of couples' vary-
ing degrees of commitment and would provide a more predictable
legal regime governing intimate relationships than we now have.
Rather than maintaining a dichotomy between married and unmar-
ried couples, law would offer a menu of choices that gives partners
greater choice over the terms of their relationships.
There are, however, at least a couple of concerns about this ar-
rangement. First, it would effectively revive explicit contract as the
basis for the rights and duties of cohabitors. While registration does
not carry some of the negative connotations that contract does in the
context of intimate relationships, partners who register nonetheless
would be entering into an agreement that provided for enforceable
rights and duties with respect to one another and third parties. Yet, as
the ALI has observed, even as courts formally invoke the doctrine of
contract, in substance they tend to rely on general equitable princi-
ples in adjudicating claims between unmarried partners.120 Such flex-
ibility is valuable in light of the fact that not all forms of vulnerability
and reliance can be explicitly anticipated in advance. Responsibilities
and expectations can arise from interdependence, not simply from
voluntary agreement, and will vary according to the course of a rela-
tionship whose trajectory necessarily will be uncertain. If domestic
partners must register in order to enjoy any rights or obligations,
many deserving individuals will be left without recourse. If some
claims will be recognized even in the absence of registration, then a
119 See supra text accompanying notes 52-71.
120 See ALI PRINCIPLES (Tentative Draft 2000), supra note 1, § 6.03 cmt. b.
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registration scheme will provide little more predictability than cur-
renfly exists.
A second concern is more subtle, but not necessarily less impor-
tant. Would law still be recognizing and encouraging commitment if
partners could calibrate in advance the specific benefits they expect to
enjoy and the particular burdens they are willing to accept? In what
sense would it be meaningful to speak of commitment that involves,
for instance, willingness to be responsible for emergency medical ex-
penses of one's partner, but unwillingness to share property equitably
if the relationship ends? Commitment, in other words, may be a bi-
nary concept, at least when intimate relationships are involved. One
may speak of the absence or presence of commitment, but one does
so less easily of commitment with respect to some aspects of the rela-
tionship but not others. Marriage has such cultural resonance be-
cause it is seen as involving an open-ended pledge to share the
uncertainties of life "for better or for worse," rather than a qualified
promise to bear some risks but not others.
To be sure, few if any partners can live up to this ideal. The exi-
gencies of daily life and the frailties of human beings inevitably con-
strain our ability to realize it. Acknowledging that these practical
obstacles will almost certainly arise, however, is different from specify-
ing at the outset that there are limits on the commitment that one is
willing to make. Marriage may be valuable as a "regulative ideal," an
aspiration that shapes purposive activity, even if that activity never
fully fulfills the aspiration that animates it.121 Will marriage continue
to serve this function if it is one option among many on a menu of
legally recognized intimate relationships?
IV. SAAM-SEx COUiL'uS
As I noted at the outset, my discussion of the legal treatment of
unmarried couples is based on the premise that marriage should be
extended to same-sex couples. In the absence of this step, laws treat-
ing same-sex domestic partners similarly to spouses may be a reasona-
ble way to acknowledge both that gays and lesbians may be involved in
committed relationships and that there is some resistance to making
marriage available to them. It is worth noting, however, that the goal
of preserving the distinctiveness of marriage and avoiding blurring its
differences with unmarried intimate relationships may in fact be
served by permitting same-sex couples to marry if they choose.
121 See generaly DOROTHY E.ET, THE RoLE OF THE UNR . BLE: A STrYDv iN RE(
ULATVE I EAs (1994) (defending reliance on regulative ideals as a valuable form of
moral standard).
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First, some of the impetus for the enactment of domestic partner
legislation has been a desire to provide at least a measure of legal
recognition for committed same-sex relationships.122 Some provisions
that extend benefits to both same-sex and opposite-sex domestic part-
ners may well reflect the fear that failure to include the latter group
may prompt a legal challenge. If marriage were available to gays and
lesbians, some, although not all, of the pressure for domestic partner
legislation might abate. All intimate couples who wished to make a
significant commitment to one another would be able to marry.
States could then reasonably assume that unmarried couples generally
represented those partners who did not wish to make such a commit-
ment. While it would be appropriate to provide some legal benefits to
such couples in accordance with the analytical framework that I have
suggested, there might be less insistence on fully comparable treat-
ment of married and unmarried couples.
A second benefit is admittedly more speculative, but perhaps
more important. Despite elimination of most of the formal legal pro-
visions reinforcing traditional spousal gender roles, marriage as a cul-
tural symbol undeniably is still associated with the adoption of these
roles. Surely there are some couples who are deeply committed to
one another who nonetheless are wary of marrying, because they see it
as entry into a patriarchal institution kept alive by social expectations.
If same-sex couples were able to marry, however, there would be a
body of spouses for whom gender could not serve as the basis for a
division of labor. Marriage, in other words, would no longer be an
exclusively gendered relationship, thereby confounding traditional
expectations that rest on this feature.'23 This severance could well
change the cultural meaning of marriage, investing it with a more
egalitarian ethos. Such a development would remove what may be an
important obstacle to marriage by committed partners, thereby mak-
ing even more justified legal distinctions between married and unmar-
ried couples.
CONCLUSION
I have argued that society is justified in treating marriage as a
legally privileged intimate relationship, thereby preserving a distinc-
122 In Vermont, of course, legislation is a response to the state supreme court's
requirement that the state find some way to make available to same-sex couples the
marital benefits that are provided to those who marry. See Baker v. State, 744 A.2d
864, 886 (Vt. 1999).
123 See Nan D. Hunter, Marriage, Law, and Gender: A Feminist Inquiry, 1 LAw & SExu.
AL= 9, 18-19 (1991).
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tion between married and unmarried couples. Due regard for practi-
cal realities, however, supports treating marriage and cohabitation
similarly in certain circumstances. In general, these are when an indi-
vidual is rendered vulnerable by virtue of her reliance on a nonmarital
relationship or wishes to express his or her commitment by assuming
responsibilities to a partner or child. If more couples cohabit, we can
expect more cases in which the law recognizes these interests. This
itself could begin to blur the perception that there is a meaningful
difference between marriage and cohabitation. If marriage involves
fewer exclusive benefits, its burdens may seem more pronounced.
Might this make marriage appear even less desirable than
cohabitation?
One response is that, in many cases, recognizing the claim of one
domestic partner also involves imposing a duty on the other. This is
true, for instance, with respect to financial awards at the time an un-
married couple separates. In addition, certain rights represent the
assumption of an obligation, such as the right to make medical or
other decisions on behalf of an incapacitated partner. To the extent
that rights and responsibilities are paired, the perceived distinctive
burdens of marriage may seem less.
Nonetheless, a second response is that it is precisely the greater
obligations involved in marriage that give it a special status as the pre-
eminent expression of intimate commitment. A willingness to assume
burdens and responsibilities that could easily be avoided can signal a
special depth of commitment. The acceptance of limits on individual
freedom, when an alternative exists that offers many benefits without
such restrictions, could make marriage an even more powerful cul-
tural symbol. What is unclear is whether this will come at the cost of
fewer marriages. Will marriage become a more potent, but less cho-
sen, social arrangement?
Perhaps. To try to prevent this by resolutely refusing to provide
any legal benefits to cohabitors, however, seems misguided. First, it
would result in hardship in many cases. Furthermore, it is by no
means certain that this would discourage cohabitation and encourage
marriage. The dramatic increase in cohabitation in recent decades
has come during a period in which legal benefits have been made
available haltingly and inconsistently. The social practice of cohabita-
tion seems to have placed increasing pressure on the law, rather than
law prompting changes in behavior.
This suggests that preserving the legal distinctiveness of marriage
may have an ambiguous impact. On the one hand, couples may be
only vaguely familiar with the legal rights and duties that accompany
marriage when they make decisions about their relationships. This
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suggests that different legal treatment of marriage and cohabitation
may have little effect on the choices of intimate partners. At the same
time, marriage remains the most significant symbol of commitment to
a shared intimate life between adults. As a cultural icon, it may be
more powerful than ever. Eliminating all or most legal distinctions
between it and cohabitation could begin to erode that symbolic role-
even though the ability to describe precisely how this might happen is
maddeningly elusive.
Marriage and cohabitation ultimately should evoke considerable
humility for those attempting to trace the intricate connections
among law, culture, and behavior. This is an area in which grand pro-
nouncements and categorical approaches are less useful than aware-
ness of the limits of rationality and appreciation of "the crooked
timber of humanity."1 24 Perhaps more than any other dimension of
life, intimate relationships remind us that what we care about most
may be hardest to attain by design. Yet, the very importance of those
relationships makes it seem unthinkable not to try. In the end, we are
left with the paradox that Karl Llewellyn described so well: "Law
means so pitifully little to life. Life is so terrifyingly dependent on the
law."' 25
124 See generally IsAAI BERLIN, TimE CROOKED TIMBER OF HuMANITr: Cu A1rERS IN
THE HisroRY OF IDEAS (1991) (suggesting in various essays that there is no single
human way of life superior to all others).
125 Karl N. Llewellyn, What Price Contract?-An Essay in Perspective, 40 YALE LJ. 704,
751 (1931).
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